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We use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate a model that allows temporary
gaps between a true expectational Phillips curve and the monetary authority's approximating non-
expectational Phillips curve. A dynamic programming problem implies that the monetary authority's
inflation target evolves as its estimated Phillips curve moves. Our estimates attribute the rise and fall
of post WWII inflation in the US to an intricate interaction between the monetary authority's beliefs
and economic shocks. Shocks in the 1970s altered the monetary authority's estimates and made it
misperceive the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. That caused a sharp rise in inflation
in the 1970s. Our estimates say that policymakers updated their beliefs continuously. By the 1980s,
their beliefs about the Phillips curve had changed enough to account for Volcker's conquest of US
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, many statesmen and macroeconomists believe that inﬂation can largely be de-
termined by a government monetary authority. Then why did the Federal Reserve Board
preside over high US inﬂation during the late 1960s and the 1970s? And why, under Paul
Volcker, did it rapidly bring inﬂation down during the early 1980s? This paper answers
these questions by estimating a model that features a particular process that makes a pro-
cession of economic shocks induce the monetary authority to alter its model of inﬂation-
unemployment dynamics, the Phillips curve. At each datet, the monetary authority updates
its beliefs about the Phillips curve and then recomputes a ﬁrst-period action recommended
by a “Phelps problem”, a discounted dynamic programming problem that minimizes the
expected value of a discounted quadratic loss function of inﬂation and unemployment.1
The monetary authority pursues the same objectives at each date, using the same structural
model, with only its estimates of that model changing over time.2 This model of the sys-
tematic part of inﬂation puts the monetary authority’s beliefs about the Phillips curve front
and center.3
We assume that the monetary authority’s model of the Phillips curve deviates in two
subtle but important ways from what it would be in a rational expectations model (e.g.,
Kydland and Prescott (1977)). The ﬁrst deviation is that, while the true Phillips curve is
like Kydland and Prescott’s, we assume that the monetary authority omits the public’s ex-
pected rate of inﬂation from its Phillips curve. By itself, this omission need not prevent
the outcomes of our model from coinciding with those of Kydland and Prescott’s, nor need
it imply that the government’s model is wrong in a way that could be detected from even
1Sargent (1999) contributed the nomenclature Phelps problem.
2There is some debate about whether policy objectives or the structural models used by policymakers have
evolved over time. However introducing such an evolution of understanding into formal models is difﬁcult
without arbitrarily imposing exogenous changes. We need no such exogenous shifts.
3As does Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) model of time-consistent suboptimal inﬂation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 3
an inﬁnite sample. Whether the monetary authority’s model is wrong in a statistically de-
tectable way depends on how we allow the monetary authority to reestimate the parameters
of its model. In particular, if the monetary authority were to believe that the coefﬁcients of
its Phillips curve are constant over time, then its estimates would converge to ones that sup-
port a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE). After convergence, its estimated Phillips curve
would correctly describe occurrences along the SCE path for inﬂation and unemployment.
Such an after-convergence version of our model has little hope of explaining the rise and
fall of US inﬂation: that model would have inﬂation ﬂuctuating randomly around a con-
stant SCE level that coincides with Kydland and Prescott’s time consistent suboptimal (i.e.,
excessive) level.4
This outcome motivates our second subtle deviation from a rational expectations equi-
librium. Instead of thinking that the regression coefﬁcients in its Phillips curve are time
invariant (which they indeed are in an SCE), our monetary authority believes that they
form a vector random walk with innovation covariance matrix V. Given that model, the
monetary authority updates its beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The covariance matrix V and the
initial condition for the regression parameters in the monetary authority’s Phillips curve
become the hyperparameters of a model that shapes evolution of the monetary authority’s
beliefs.5 After calibrating the initial condition and imposing that the systematic part of
inﬂation is determined by the time t solution of the Phelps problem, we estimate V along
with parameters of the true expectational Phillips curve that, unbeknownst to the monetary
authority, truly describes inﬂation-unemployment dynamics. Using a Bayesian Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, we report statistics that describe the posterior dis-
tribution of these parameters of our model. We obtain a much better explanation of the
4Michael Parkin (1993) and Peter Ireland (1999) advocate the hypothesis that the post WWII US inﬂation
data can be accounted for by well understood medium term movements in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, stable government preferences, and a steady adherence to the time-consistent suboptimal equilibrium
of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
5As would be true in a rational expectations model, the monetary authority’s beliefs are outcomes, not free
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monetary authority’s inﬂation choices than earlier efforts to estimate similar models had
achieved.
With very particular a priori settings of the parameter innovation covariance matrix V,
Sims (1988), Chung (1990), Sargent (1999), and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) all
studied versions of our model.6 When Chung and Sargent estimated their a-priori-ﬁxed-
V versions of our model, they obtained discouraging results. They did not come close to
explaining the rise and fall of US inﬂation in terms of a process of the monetary authority’s
learning about its Phillips curve.7
This paper estimates settings for V that attain substantial improvements in the model’s
ability to rationalize the choices made by the US monetary authority. The MCMC algo-
rithmﬁndsvaluesforV thatallowthemodeltoreverseengineerfromthedataasequenceof
government beliefs about the Phillips curve that, through the intermediation of the Phelps
problem, capture both the acceleration of US inﬂation in the 1970s and its rapid decline in
the early 1980s. Our MCMC method estimates aV that accommodates an avenue by which
economic shocks impinge on the monetary authority’s beliefs, via its use of Bayes’ rule,
and its decisions, via successive solutions of its Phelps problem. The monetary authority’s
views about parameter drift and its application of Bayes’ rule add a source of history de-
pendence to its procession of decisions that is absent, for example, in either Sargent’s SCE
or the Markov perfect equilibrium of Kydland and Prescott’s model. The resulting interac-
tions of shocks and monetary beliefs forms the basis for our explanation of the rise and fall
of US inﬂation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we lay out the model and
discuss the theoretical characterizations of it. In Section III, we develop a method for the
6Sargent and Williams (2003) is an extensive theoretical study of a version of our model that focuses on
the impact of different settings of V on rates of convergence to, escapes from, and cycles around an SCE.
7Previous failures to match the data with a model like ours seem to be widely recognized and helped to
promote a literature that makes the “stickiness” (or persistence) of inﬂation exogenous.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 5
estimation and inference of the model. Section IV presents our empirical results, exam-
ines the performance of the model, and explores implications. Section V conducts some
counterfactual exercises. Section VI relates our ﬁndings to some other literature. Finally,
Section VII concludes. Six appendices describe the data, provide technical details about
the setting of our prior distribution for estimation and the sampling scheme for inference,
compare key forecasting features of our learning model to those of alternative statistical
models, and report statistical inference on the estimates of the government’s inﬂation pol-
icy and perceived tradeoffs.
II. THE MODEL
The model is an extension of Sargent and Williams (2003), which is composed of a
Lucas-Sargent natural-rate version of the Phillips curve and a true inﬂation process:
ut ¡u¤ = q0(pt ¡Et¡1pt)+q1(pt¡1¡Et¡2pt¡1)+t1(ut¡1¡u¤)+s1w1t; (1)
pt = xt¡1+s2w2t; (2)
where ut is the unemployment rate, pt is inﬂation, xt is the part of inﬂation controllable by
the government given the information up to time t, and w1t and w2t are i.i.d. uncorrelated
standard normal random variables. Equation (1) is an expectations-augmented Phillips
curve. If abs(q0) > abs(q1), (1) becomes a version of a natural-rate Phillips curve that
allows a serially correlated disturbance (Sargent 1999). Equation (2) states that the govern-
ment sets policy to inﬂuence inﬂation up to a random shock. The government’s policy is to
minimize a loss function that dislikes both inﬂation and unemployment. The decision xt¡1







dt((pt ¡p¤)2+l(ut ¡u¤¤)2) (3)
subject to (2) and
ut = ˆ a0
tjt¡1Ft +swt; (4)SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 6
where p¤ and u¤¤ are the targeted levels of inﬂation and unemployment, both ˆ atjt¡1 and
Ft are r£1 vectors, wt is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable, and where (4) is the
core of the monetary authority’s model of inﬂation-unemployment dynamics. The vector
Ft of regressors consists of lags of unemployment and inﬂation. By comparing (4) with
(1), we see that the government fails to account explicitly for the role of expectations in
determining the unemployment rate. Here ˆ E represents expectations with respect to the
government’s subjective model, and the subscript t ¡1 means that the government updates
ˆ atjt¡1 and at each t computes xt¡1 by solving the time t Phelps problem before observing
pt and ut. Thus, the government sets policy based on its misspeciﬁed Phillips curve (4), not
the true Phillips curve (1). A self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) is a vector of government
beliefs ¯ a that is consistent with what it observes in the sense of satisfying the population







where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution of ut;pt, and xt¡1
that satisﬁes (1), (2), and the decision rule when the government optimizes based on ¯ a.
Self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcomes agree with the time-consistent Nash equilibrium
outcomes in which policymakers set inﬂation at a higher level than the socially optimal






The larger are u¤¡u¤¤, q0, and q1 in absolute value, the higher is the Nash inﬂation rate
compared to the Ramsey rate p¤.
A self-conﬁrming equilibrium is a population concept that restricts beliefs to be time-
invariant and that is a benchmark – and as it sometimes turns out, a limit point – for our
model. In our model, unlike an SCE, at any point in history the government updates its
beliefs as it learns. In particular, the government bases ˆ atjt¡1, its mean estimate of the
8As explained by Sargent (1999, chapter 3), the gap between the Ramsey and Nash or SCE outcomes for
inﬂation reﬂects the beneﬁt to the government of being able to commit to a policy.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 7
drifting parameter vector at, on the observations up to and including time t ¡1 from the
following (misspeciﬁed) econometric model:
ut = a0
tFt +swt; (7)
at = at¡1+Lt; (8)
where Lt, uncorrelated with wt, is an i.i.d. Gaussian random vector with mean 0 and co-
variance matrix V. Thus, the government believes that the true economy drifts over time.
That is why it continually adapts its parameter estimates. The innovation covariance matrix
V governs the perceived volatility of increments to the parameters, and is a key component
of the model. The mean estimate of at for the econometric model (7)-(8) is
ˆ atjt¡1 ´ ˆ E(atjIt¡1);
It ´ fu1;p1;:::;ut;ptg:
Let
Ptjt¡1 ´ d Var(atjIt¡1):
Given the government’s model, the mean estimates are optimally updated via the special
case of Bayes rule known as the Kalman ﬁlter. Given ˆ a1j0 and P1j0, the Kalman ﬁlter
algorithm updates ˆ atjt¡1 with the following formula:













as recursive least squares (RLS), which is closely related to the Kalman ﬁlter.
An important issue about any learning rule is whether the learning process will converge
to a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. To summarize what we known about this, we scale the in-
novation covariance matrix asV = e2 ˆ V, for e > 0. Key analytical results from Sargent andSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 8
Williams (2003) that underscore the role of the government’s learning from misspeciﬁed
models are:
(1) In this model, inﬂation converges much faster to the SCE under Kalman ﬁltering
learning than under RLS. In effect, the Kalman ﬁlter learning rule with drifting
coefﬁcients seems to discount the past data more rapidly than the constant gain
RLS learning rule.
(2) As the government’s prior belief parameter e ! 0 (at the 0 limit there is no time
variation in the parameters), inﬂation converges to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium
(SCE) and the mean escape time becomes arbitrarily long.
(3) As the government’s prior belief parameter s ! 0 (in the 0 limit, there is no vari-
ation in the government’s regression error or arbitrarily large time variation in the
drifting parameters), large escapes from an SCE can happen arbitrarily often and
nonconvergence is possible.
(4) The covariance matrixV in the government’s prior belief about the volatility of the
drifting parameters affects the speed of escape. The covariance matrixV combined
with the prior belief parameter e, affects the speed of convergence to the SCE from
a low inﬂation level.
III. ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE
The theoretical results indicate how very different outcomes can emerge from different
government beliefs. The overriding task of this paper is to ﬁt the model to the data and
thereby to estimate and quantify the uncertainty about the parameters, s2 and V, jointly
with the model’s other structural parameters, including those governing the “true” expec-
tational Phillips curve (1). Before estimation, we ﬁx the values of d, l, p¤, u¤¤, and ˆ a1j0.
Group all other free structural parameters as
f = fv¤;q0;q1;t1;z1;z2;u(CP);u(CV)g;SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 9
where v¤ =u¤(1¡t1),CP andCV are upper triangular such that P1j0 =C0
PCP andV =C0
VCV,
and z1 = 1=s2
1 and z2 = 1=s2
2 represent the precisions of the corresponding innovations.
The notation u(CP) or u(CV) means that only the upper triangular part of CP or CV are
among the free parameters.
The structural parameter z = 1=s2 is not a free parameter. It is clear from (9), (10),
and (B1) that if we scale V and P1j0 by k and z by 1=k, the likelihood value remains the
same. There would exist a continuum of maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) if z were
not restricted (i.e., the model is unidentiﬁed). Some normalization is necessary. Following
Sargent and Williams, we impose the restriction z = z1. This normalization implies that
the variation that policymakers observe in the unemployment rate is correctly decomposed
into variation in the regressors and variation due to exogenous shocks. This assumption has
an advantage because it makes limiting results easier to derive.9
As we’ve noted, Sargent and Williams (2003) show that whether monetary policy stays
close to a path associated with a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, and if not, how it evolves over
time are both sensitive to the model’s parameters (especially the government’s belief about
the covariance matrix for the drifting coefﬁcients). No doubt this sensitivity contributes to
the outcome that we are able to estimate the key structural parameters sharply.
Totakeintoaccounttheparameteruncertaintyexplicitly, weemploytheBayesianmethod
and develop a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm that breaks f into three sep-





















9Note that an SCE requires the orthogonality conditions, not necessarily the equality restriction z = z1.
Indeed, the examples of Sims (1988) allow z 6= z1.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 10
and j = fu(CP);u(CV)g. The prior distributions of both q and j take a Gaussian form:
p(q) = Normal( ¯ q; ¯ Sq); (11)
p(j) = Normal( ¯ j; ¯ Sj): (12)
The prior probability density for the precision parameters z1 and z2 is a Gamma distribu-
tion:









¯ b : (13)
The posterior distribution of f can be simulated by alternately sampling from the condi-




The following two propositions state that the ﬁrst two conditional posterior distributions
are Gaussian. Appendix B offers a proof.
Proposition 1.






















1 z2t z2t¡1 ut¡1
i0
;
z1t = ut ¡u¤¡q0(pt ¡Et¡1pt)¡q1(pt¡1¡Et¡2pt¡1)¡t1(ut¡1¡u¤);
z2t = pt ¡xt¡1:SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 11
Proposition 2.


















it + ¯ b¡1; 8i 2 f1;2g:
The government’s optimization problem renders the conditional posterior pdf
p(j j IT;q;z1;z2)
one of nonstandard form. To draw from this distribution, therefore, we use the following
Metropolis algorithm.
Metropolis Algorithm. We employ four steps to simulate j from its conditional posterior
distribution.
(1) Given the value jlast, compute the proposal draw
jprop = jlast+x;
where x is randomly drawn from the normal distribution with mean zero and co-
variance c ˜ Sj speciﬁed in (D1). The scale factor c will be adjusted to keep the









(3) Randomly draw n from the uniform distribution U(0;1).
(4) If n <= q, accept jprop as the value of the current draw; otherwise, keep jlast as
the value of the current draw.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 12
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 and the properties of the Metropolis algorithm
that a large number of MCMC samples alternately drawn from these conditional posterior
distributions will eventually form an empirical distribution of f that emulates the posterior
distribution.10
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section, we present our results. Using the monthly US data described in Appendix
A and the prior speciﬁed in Appendix C, we estimate f by maximizing the posterior density
function. We obtained similar results using maximum likelihood, but the prior is crucial
for small sample inference. In estimation, we set d = 0:9936;l = 1;p¤ = 2, and u¤¤ = 1.
The value of u¤¤ is set at a low value to allow Nash inﬂation to be higher than Ramsey
inﬂation.11 Setting the unemployment target closer to the natural rate has no effect our
main results.
12
The initial belief ˆ a1j0 is set at the regression estimate using the presample data from
January 1948 to December 1959.13 We tried to ﬁx P1j0 at the value that scales up and down
the presample regression estimate ˆ s2(F0F)¡1, but the ﬁt was extremely poor. Similarly,
letting V be ﬁxed at the presample-estimated covariance matrix with different scales does
10For each draw of f, z is normalized to be equal to z1 before the government’s inﬂation policy is solved.
This normalization is consistent with Wald normalization discussed in Hamilton, Waggoner, and Zha (2003).
11Alan Blinder (1998) emphasizes that the source of time inconsistency in Kydland and Prescott’s (1977)
Phillips curve example is their setting u¤¤ 6= u¤ in the monetary authority’s preferences (3). Citing his ex-
perience as Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Blinder questions whether there was ever much of a gap
between u¤¤ and u¤.
12Narrowing the gap between u¤ and u¤¤ slightly increases the magnitude of the estimated Phillips curve
slope parameters q0 and q1. But this change is small enough as to be essentially inconsequential for our
results.
13In an earlier draft, we followed Chung (1990) to let this belief be estimated using the sample data. Since
it is inﬂuenced by the updated beliefs in the sample, the value estimated this way is as difﬁcult to interpret as
that in Chung.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 13
not improve the poor ﬁt.14 Departing from Sargent (1999), therefore, we estimate the gov-
ernment’s prior beliefs P1j0 and V within the sample. Our MCMC or maximum likelihood
algorithm is “reverse engineering” the empirical Phillips curve at each date that, in con-
junction with the Phelps problem, is needed to rationalize that date’s inﬂation rate. Such
ﬂexibility is crucial to allow this reverse engineering to back out correct correlations in
P1j0 and V. Moreover, this ﬂexibility is arguably reasonable. The presample data may be
informative of the government’s subjective point estimates (which we ﬁx), but less so of its
subjective uncertainty (which we estimate). Thus, we use the presample data to pin down
the mean of the government’s estimate of the empirical Phillips curve, but not to estimate
the belief innovation covariance matrix V.
IV.1. Model Fit. The posterior estimate of f is reported in Table 1, along with the 68%
and 90% probability intervals around the estimate.15 In our estimation and inference, the
regressor vector in the government’s (subtly) misspeciﬁed Phillips regression is:
Ft =
h
pt pt¡1 ut¡1 pt¡2 ut¡2 1
i0
:
As mentioned, among the parameters that we estimate are those of the expectational
Phillips curve (1) that we assume truly governs the data. As can be seen in Table 1, the
natural rate of unemployment u¤ in equation (1) is estimated to be 6.1 and its probability
intervals are wide, consistent with the conﬁdence interval in the statistical model of Staiger,
Stock, and Watson (1997). Responses of unemployment to inﬂation surprises (q0 and q1)
are extremely weak and are statistically insigniﬁcant by the probability intervals. This is
an important ﬁnding for us, partly because it implies from (6) that Nash inﬂation is close
to p¤ despite the large difference between u¤ and u¤¤. In the long run, therefore, the mean
dynamics of inﬂation are always close to the Ramsey outcomes. Unemployment is by itself
a persistent series and the persistence is tightly estimated.
14This point is illustrated further in Section V.2.
15All probability intervals are derived from the empirical joint posterior distribution generated from a
sequence of 50,000 MCMC draws.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 14
It can be seen from the estimates and probability intervals of z1 and z2 that their posterior
distribution is tight but skewed downward, especially for z1 whose posterior estimate is
outside the 90% interval.
The estimated P1j0 shows strong correlations (at least above 0:95) among all the ele-
ments. The relatively large variance for the drifting coefﬁcient on pt¡2 (the 4th element)
implies that the government is quite uncertain about this coefﬁcient, which affects the un-
certainty about other coefﬁcients even though their marginal variances are relatively small.
The estimatedV shows strong correlations among the coefﬁcients on current and lagged
inﬂation variables. The variances on the inﬂation variables are large in the sense of Sar-
gent and Williams (2003). The constant term has a very large variance and affects the
coefﬁcients on the lagged unemployment variables because of high correlations, but it has
a small inﬂuence on the inﬂation coefﬁcients in the government’s model. Because V is
not small, the government’s beliefs are likely to drift signiﬁcantly and inﬂation is likely to
escape to the near-Ramsey region. Our estimates of the true expectational Phillips curve
(1) imply that there is a negligible difference between the SCE and p¤. But as we show
later, even when we artiﬁcially alter the parameters of (1) to allow the SCE inﬂation rate to
be considerably higher than the Ramsey rate, this large V permits frequent escapes to low
inﬂation rates.
The one-step forecasts of inﬂation are plotted against the actual path in Figure 1, and
one-step forecasts of unemployment are plotted against the actual path in Figure 2. It is ev-
ident from these ﬁgures that the model ﬁts the data well; so well, in fact, that it is difﬁcult to
discern the difference between the series. By this ﬁt criterion, our reverse engineering ex-
ercise is a success, especially compared to those carried out by Chung (1990) and Sargent
(1999). Figures 3 and 4 plot the one-step forecast errors for inﬂation and unemployment,
showing that for most of the sample, the forecasts are within one half a percentage point
of the realized value.16 In Appendix E we provide a more formal comparison of our model
16These forecast errors are comparable to those from the random walk model or an AR(1) model. These
statistical models treat an inﬂation process to be exogenous.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 15
TABLE 1. Posterior estimates of model parameters
Log value of posterior kernel at its peak: 81:56096
Estimates of coefﬁcients in true Phillips curve and inﬂation process
with 68% and 90% probability intervals in parentheses
u¤ : 6:1104 (5:2500;7:1579) (4:2238;9:0586)
q0 : ¡0:0008 (¡0:0237;0:0475) (¡0:0458;0:0719)
q1 : ¡0:0122 (¡0:0375;0:0297) (¡0:0589;0:0526)
t1 : 0:9892 (0:9852;0:9960) (0:9817;0:9996)
z1 : 35:6538 (28:7565;32:4947) (27:6017;33:7890)
z2 : 18:97671 (15:6565;18:2557) (14:7008;19:1196)
Estimate of P1j0:
10:8705 14:3236 2:2518 ¡25:4037 ¡0:9279 ¡10:1548
14:3236 19:3721 2:9624 ¡33:9832 ¡1:1883 ¡13:5923
2:2518 2:9624 0:4690 ¡5:2629 ¡0:1928 ¡2:1050
¡25:4037 ¡33:9832 ¡5:2629 59:8997 2:1339 23:9551
¡0:9279 ¡1:1883 ¡0:1928 2:1339 0:0816 0:8526
¡10:1548 ¡13:5923 ¡2:1050 23:9551 0:8526 9:5810
Estimate of V:
8:2323 ¡7:7781 0:9208 4:9782 ¡0:8136 ¡41:414
¡7:7781 8:1400 0:0303 ¡5:089 1:9353 68:591
0:9208 0:0303 2:9854 0:1187 3:7012 72:067
4:9782 ¡5:089 0:1187 3:2032 ¡1:0548 ¡39:963
¡0:8136 1:9353 3:7012 ¡1:0548 5:1362 100:6400
¡41:414 68:591 72:067 ¡39:963 100:6400 2588:3000SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 16



































FIGURE 1. Inﬂation: actual vs one-step forecast (i.e, government controlled inﬂation)








































FIGURE 2. Unemployment rate: actual vs one-step forecastSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 17

























FIGURE 3. Differences between actual values and one-step forecasts of inﬂation





























FIGURE 4. Differences between actual values and one-step forecasts of unemploymentSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 18
to an atheoretical VAR. There we show that the VAR outperforms our model based on a
marginal likelihood criterion, although this may be sensitive to the priors we chose in esti-
mating our model. In terms of forecasting the rise and fall of inﬂation, our model performs
as well as or better than the VAR. Without any assumption about exogenous components
of the persistence of inﬂation, the government’s inﬂation policy explains, almost entirely,
the rise and fall of post-war American inﬂation (Figure 1). This kind of result has not been
achieved in previous work (e.g., Sims 1988, Chung 1990, and Sargent 1999).
IV.2. Short-Run Dynamics: Shocks and Beliefs. The rise and fall of inﬂation in our
model is driven by the Phelps problem in conjunction with government’s belief in an ex-
ploitable tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment, which leads to a high inﬂation rate
in the early 70s. But then occasional sequences of stochastic shocks lead the government
temporarily to believe that it can cut inﬂation with no rise in unemployment, which leads
to rapid disinﬂations in the early 80s. During these episodes, the government learns a
version of the natural rate theory in which the sum of the coefﬁcients on inﬂation in the
government’s model is nearly zero, reﬂecting a vertical long-run Phillips curve.
Such an evolution of the government’s updated beliefs are displayed in Figure 5. The
sum of the coefﬁcients on inﬂation becomes very negative in the early 70s and stay quite
negative until the late 70s. In the 1980s, although the sum of the inﬂation coefﬁcients is still
negative, it is small enough for policymakers to decide cutting inﬂation without worrying
much about costs in unemployment.
Figure 6 displays the suspected covariations in the drift of some key parameters in the
government’s Phillips curve, derived from our estimated V reported in Table 1. These
key parameters are the sum of the coefﬁcients on current and lagged inﬂation variables
(a1+a2+a4), the sum of the coefﬁcients on current and lagged unemployment variables
(1¡a3 ¡a5), and the coefﬁcient on the constant term (a6). As shown by the symbol
“¤” in the ﬁrst row of graphs of Figure 6, the estimated constant coefﬁcient has a large,
positive value while the sum of the estimated inﬂation coefﬁcients is quite negative. ThisSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 19








From March 1960 to December 2003
Sum of p coefs
FIGURE 5. Evolution of the government’s beliefs
combination leads to a perceived high tradeoff between unemployment and inﬂation in
December 1973.
In contrast, at the point associated with the SCE (indicated by the symbol “±” in the
second row of Figure 6), the estimated constant coefﬁcient is small and the sum of the
inﬂation coefﬁcients is near zero, giving the government no incentive to inﬂate in pursuit
of lower unemployment.
The probability ellipses shown in Figure 6 are quite large along the dimension of the
constant coefﬁcient. The large variation implies that a tradeoff between inﬂation and un-
employment can be severe if there is a high probability of the constant coefﬁcient and the
sum of the inﬂation coefﬁcients falling far into the north-west quadrant, as in the case of the
upper-left graph. The bottom-left graph shows the historical estimates of these two belief
parameters, induced by the particular sequence of shocks throughout our post-war sam-
ple. The area in which the sum of the inﬂation coefﬁcients is less than -1 and the constant
coefﬁcient is greater than 15 covers most of the estimates for the 70s.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 20




























































































































FIGURE 6. 68% and 90% probability ellipses about key parameters in the
government’s Phillips curve. The ﬁrst row is based on the observation at
73:12; the second row is based on a limiting case associated with an SCE;
the third row displays scattered plots of the estimates throughout our 60:02-
03:12 sample. The asterisk symbol ¤ in the ﬁrst row depicts the govern-
ment’s estimates at 73:12. The circle symbol ± in the second and third rows
depicts SCE values, which also equal limiting estimates from the mean dy-
namics.
The constant and the sum of the unemployment coefﬁcients are highly but negatively
correlated, as shown in the ﬁrst two graphs in the second column of Figure 6. Later we
will see that in the transition to the SCE the economy may go through periods of very
volatile inﬂation. The negative correlation between the constant and the unemployment
coefﬁcients is the most likely cause of these volatile inﬂation paths, if these two parametersSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 21












Perceived Long−Run Excess Unemployment Under Ramsey Policy
FIGURE 7. Perceived long-run excess unemployment under the Ramsey
policy of 2% inﬂation according to the government’s model.
fall in the south-east and north-west quadrants. Fortunately for US inﬂation outcomes, our
historical estimates have been concentrated around the north-east quadrant, as shown in the
bottom-right graph. It is only in out of sample simulations that we enter the more volatile
regions.
Thethreebeliefparametersdiscussedabovearekeyinputstothegovernment’sperceived
sacriﬁce ratio. The government’s estimate of the long-run unemployment above the natural




Under any inﬂation policy in history that differs from Ramsey, the tradeoff will be a simple
scaled version of (16) in proportion to that difference.17 Figure 7 plots the government’s
17Note that our measure of the sacriﬁce ratio differs from the more conventional usage, which gives the
cost of disinﬂating from a current inﬂation rate. Instead, ours is a long-run measure, independent of current
inﬂation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 22
perceived long run excess unemployment under the Ramsey policy. Here we see that,
throughout the 1970s, the government’s model implied that substantial increases in unem-
ployment would result from a low inﬂation policy.18 It wasn’t until the early 1980s that
this ratio fell to near zero, at which time the disinﬂation commenced. This point will be
reinforced below when we present medium term forecasts around that time.
IV.3. Two Peaks and an Enduring Decline. We now analyze how the model forecasts
the two peaks of inﬂation in the 1970s and the sharp decline in the early 1980s. We use
Monte Carlo simulations to assess the distribution of forecasts going forward over four
year horizons from different initial conditions. In each case, we take the estimated beliefs
at the starting date and draw 5000 simulations of 50 periods each.19 The ﬁgures then plot
the actual experienced inﬂation and the estimated government controlled inﬂation (xt¡1),
along with 68% and 90% probability bands. In each plot, the initial condition is shown as
date zero, from which we look forward 50 periods.
Figure 8 reports the forecasts. The upper left panel starts in January 1973 when inﬂation
was at a very low level (3:3%). This is also near the time that the government most overes-
timated the tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment (see Figure 5). According to the
model, the government exploited the tradeoff and pushed up inﬂation to lower unemploy-
ment. The model predicts a steadily rising inﬂation path as high as 10% towards the end
of the 4-year horizon (the upper 90% band), and gives little probability to a lower inﬂation
rate in the medium run.
Due to a sequence of shocks, the inﬂation path actually experienced reached its peak
earlier than the model predicts. But this is a treacherous period in which to predict, and
18A temporary drop in this sacriﬁce ratio around 1976 led to a temporary decline in inﬂation around that
time. See Cogley and Sargent (2004) for a story in which the government was deterred from stabilizing in
the mid 1970s because it attached a small positive probability to a model that assigned high unemployment
costs to a rapid deﬂation.
19Adding uncertainty in the parameters would certainly widen our forecast bands.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 23






























Forecast months after 73:01
Actual
Median forecast






























Forecast months after 74:01
Actual
Median forecast






























Forecast months after 77:01
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Forecast months after 80:04
Actual
Median forecast
FIGURE 8. Dynamic forecasts of inﬂation with 68% and 90% error bands,
using as initial estimated conditions at 73:01, 74:01, 77:01, and 80:04.
the prediction of rising inﬂation by the model compares favorably to alternative statistical
models (see Appendix E).
A year later in January 1974, which is shown in the upper right panel of Figure 8, in-
ﬂation had continued upward, now reaching 8.4%. Here we see that the model tracks the
actual inﬂation path quite well, predicting a further increase in inﬂation prior to a return to
lower levels.
January 1977 was another difﬁcult time to predict inﬂation because inﬂation was at its
trough and a second run-up was about to begin. Although actual inﬂation reached its peakSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 24
at the later date, the model assigns an overwhelming probability to higher inﬂation and the
upper 90% reaches as high as 10% (the lower left panel).
The disinﬂation episode in the early 1980s is often interpreted as reﬂecting the intellec-
tual triumph of the rational expectations version of the natural rate theory. What does our
learning model say about this period? Would the government continue to pursue a higher
inﬂation policy? After all, from the vantage point of April 1980 when inﬂation reached
its second peak, most forecasting models either predict that inﬂation was very likely to go
higher than it actually did, or they fail to predict the fall of inﬂation. The lower right panel
of Figure 8 displays the forecast from our learning model. While actual inﬂation declines
at somewhat a slower speed than what the model predicts in 1980 and 1981, the forecast of
a fast decline in inﬂation is remarkable. The model’s prediction is especially good further
out in the forecasting period. Unlike many forecasting models, our model gives almost no
probability to rising inﬂation in the medium horizon, because the tradeoff between inﬂa-
tion and unemployment by then is not high enough for the government to pursue higher
inﬂation.
IV.4. Long-Run Dynamics. So far we have shown that our model is able to explain and
predict the rise and fall of US inﬂation experienced. It is equally important to examine the
long run properties of the model to see if the government’s adapting beliefs will eventually
lead to good inﬂation outcomes. We ﬁrst discuss the convergence of our baseline model to
a limit distribution. Then we analyze the small variation limits as in Sargent and Williams
(2003).
IV.4.1. Long-RunConvergence. Figure9showstheinﬂationdynamicsover30,000months
starting at our estimated initial conditions: 1960:03 (the beginning of the sample), 1973:12
(the date where the sum of the p coefﬁcients is most negative in the sample), and 2003:12
(the end of the sample). Clearly, they all converge to a limiting distribution around the
Ramsey outcomes. This convergence occurs from the estimated initial conditions at anySHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 25
date. The ﬂuctuations at the beginning of the simulation reﬂect the rise and fall of Amer-
ican inﬂation that was temporarily off the equilibrium. As shown in the lower left panel,
we are likely to see some high inﬂation in the near future but such high inﬂation is caused
purely by exogenous random shocks to inﬂation, as the government will continue to see
no tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment (see the lower right panel of Figure 9).
The government’s beliefs are volatile for a while but eventually the sum of coefﬁcients on
inﬂation converges to near zero.20 Consequently, the mean dynamics suggest that inﬂation
converges to around 2%. These long run properties foster a view of US monetary his-
tory as a process of continual learning before inﬂation becomes stable around the Ramsey
outcomes.
IV.4.2. Small Variation Limits. In the previous section, we saw evidence from simulations
that the economy converges to a limit distribution. In order to obtain more explicit analytic
results, we consider small variation limits. While it is difﬁcult to obtain explicit results for
any arbitrary setting of V, for smaller V the beliefs drift at a slower rate, allowing us to
approximate their evolution with a differential equation. In particular, as in Sargent and
Williams (2003), we letV =e2 ˆ V and study limits as e !0. However, Ptjt !0 as e !0, so
we deﬁne a scaled matrix ˆ Ptjt =Ptjt=e that does not vanish. Sargent and Williams show that
as e ! 0, the sequence fatjt; ˆ Ptjtg generated by (9)-(10) converges weakly to the solution
20 In those volatile periods, the constant coefﬁcient in the government’s estimated Phillips curve is often
very large (on the order of 100) and the sum of the unemployment coefﬁcients tends to be negative. Thus,
these two government Phillips curve parameters fall in the north-west quadrant of the graph discussed in
Section IV.2. If the sum of the inﬂation coefﬁcients is negative, one can see from (16) that the government’s
dynamic programming problem implies a large increase in inﬂation to restrain adverse ﬂuctuations in unem-
ployment. Similarly, if this sum is positive, the government tends to generate a large rate of deﬂation. Such
values for the government parameters in our simulations are far outside of the range attained by the historical
estimates, as shown in the third row of graphs in Figure 6. When by chance we draw a sequence of shocks
that keeps these government Phillips curve parameters within their historical range, convergence to a stable
inﬂation path occurs without large swings of inﬂation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 26


























































Sum of p Coefs
FIGURE 9. Government’s inﬂation choice in long Monte Carlo simulations,
using the different estimated initial conditions.
of the following ODEs:






˙ P = s¡2 ˆ V ¡PE(FtF0
t)P; (18)
where the expectations are calculated for ﬁxed a. As we let the prior belief variance go
to zero by shrinking e, the government’s beliefs track the trajectories of these differen-
tial equations. We call the ODEs (17)-(18) the mean dynamics because they govern theSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 27








Sum of p Coef
Sum of u Coef  
Constant       
FIGURE 10. Mean dynamics for the baseline estimates, initialized at the
start of the sample.
expected evolution of the government’s beliefs. If the ODEs have a stable point (¯ a; ¯ P),
then the government’s beliefs will converge to it as e ! 0 and t ! ¥. Note from (17)
that the limiting beliefs satisfy the key least squares orthogonality condition (5) and hence
comprise a self-conﬁrming equilibrium. This orthogonality condition is the key identifying
assumption in the government’s subjective model, and in the limit it is satisﬁed by the true
model.
In Figure 10 we plot trajectories of the mean dynamics for the government’s beliefs
starting from the initial conditions at the beginning of the sample. Here we see that the
mean dynamics converge to a stable self-conﬁrming equilibrium in the long run. The self-
conﬁrming equilibrium beliefs are:
¯ a = [ ¡0:0008 ¡0:0000 0:9725 0:0000 0:0165 0:0688 ]:SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 28
Thus, we see that in the SCE the government learns the true value of q0, the effect of
current inﬂation on unemployment. In the SCE, the government believes in a small tradeoff
between inﬂation and unemployment, and so sets inﬂation slightly above the Ramsey level.
In particular, the mean inﬂation rate in the SCE is 2:24% instead of the Ramsey level of
2%.
However, the mean dynamics and the self-conﬁrming equilibrium govern the dynamics
of our model only for small e. In practice, e must be quite small, on the order of 10¡4, for
the asymptotic approximations to be accurate. Thus, for our baseline estimatedV the mean
dynamics do not fully characterize the evolution of beliefs. Loosely speaking, for any V
we get convergence to a limit distribution. As e ! 0 this limit distribution converges to a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium.
IV.5. Keynesian Direction of Fit. King and Watson (1994) discuss the importance of the
direction in which a statistical Phillips curve is ﬁt to the data. They use the adjectives
Keynesian and Classical to denote Phillips curves with unemployment on the right and left
sides, respectively.21 Unlike the version we consider above, the typical Samuelson-Solow
Keynesian type of Phillips curve puts inﬂation on the left hand side of the regression. In








subject to (2) and
pt = ˆ b0;tjt¡1ut + ˆ b1;tjt¡1ut¡1+ ˆ b2;tjt¡1pt¡1
+ ˆ b3;tjt¡1ut¡2+ ˆ b4;tjt¡1pt¡2+ ˆ b5;tjt¡1+sKwKt;
(19)
where wKt is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable.
21Sargent (1999, Chapter 7) discusses how the direction of ﬁt affects the SCE that emerges.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 29
With the normalization sK = s1, the government’s beliefs ˆ bi;tjt¡1 are updated using the
usual Kalman ﬁlter. The government’s Phelps problem is posed after inverting (19) to get
ut = ˆ a0;tjt¡1pt + ˆ a1;tjt¡1pt¡1+ ˆ a2;tjt¡1ut¡1
+ ˆ a3;tjt¡1pt¡2+ ˆ a4;tjt¡1ut¡2+ ˆ a5;tjt¡1¡stwKt;
(20)
where
ˆ a0;tjt¡1 = 1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
ˆ a1;tjt¡1 = ¡ ˆ b2;tjt¡1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
ˆ a2;tjt¡1 = ¡ ˆ b1;tjt¡1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
ˆ a3;tjt¡1 = ¡ ˆ b4;tjt¡1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
ˆ a4;tjt¡1 = ¡ ˆ b3;tjt¡1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
ˆ a5;tjt¡1 = ¡ ˆ b5;tjt¡1= ˆ b0;tjt¡1;
st = sK= ˆ b0;tjt¡1:
For comparison with our results above, we re-estimate the model using the Keynesian
direction of ﬁt. The estimated values for the structural parameters are:
u¤ = 5:7467;q0 = ¡0:0287;q1 = ¡0:0136;t1 = 0:9881;z1 = 29:4602;z2 = 4:3244;
and the log value of the posterior kernel at its peak is -271.6802, which is much smaller
than that in the classical model. These estimates are somewhat different from those for the
classical model reported in Table 1. The biggest difference shows up in the estimate of z2.
The signiﬁcantly smaller value of z2 in the Keynesian model implies large inﬂation shocks
that tend to make the system unstable.22
Figure 11 shows that even with the help of large inﬂation shocks, the ﬁt is not nearly
as good as the classical model, consistent with the ﬁndings of Cogley and Sargent (2004),
whocomputeda sequence ofBayesian posterior oddsfor three modelsof the Phillipscurve.
22The results do not change much when we normalize sK differently. For example, instead of normalizing
on sK directly, we let st = s1. This normalization implies that sK is time-varying and sKt = ˆ b0;tjt¡1s1.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 30



































FIGURE 11. Keynesian model: actual inﬂation vs one-step forecast.




























FIGURE 12. Keynesian model: differences between actual values and one-
step forecasts of inﬂation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 31










From March 1960 to December 2003
Sum of p Coefs
FIGURE 13. Keynesian model: evolution of the government’s beliefs.
The forecast errors reported in Figure 12 reinforce this point. The persistent over-prediction
of inﬂation in the early 60s is caused by the misperceived tradeoff between inﬂation and
unemployment under the estimated Keynesian Phillips curve, as is shown in Figure 13.
We see there that, throughout the 1960s, the government’s Keynesian model implied an
exploitable tradeoff. However this tradeoff dwindles in the early 70s and the sum of the
coefﬁcients on inﬂation reversed its sign sharply in the mid-to-late 70s. In particular, from
1975 to 1980 the government’s model shows no sign of a tradeoff (Figure 13), and hence
the model predicts lower inﬂation than actually occurred over this period (Figure 12). It is
difﬁcult to explain why the government did not cut inﬂation in the late 70s within the Key-
nesian story. One possibility is that because of large shocks in the government’s Keynesian
Phillips curve, policymakers decided to ignore the evidence that there was no tradeoff in the
later part of 1970s. Instead, they produced high inﬂation based on an inherited Keynesian
belief that the tradeoff must be there.
23
23This interpretation was provided by James Nason, based on oral descriptions by Fed policymakers.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 32

































FIGURE 14. Inﬂation dynamics with ﬁxed beliefs at the dates 64:01 and 73:12.
V. COUNTERFACTUAL RESULTS
As a way to quantify the role of econometric policy evaluation in the government’s learn-
ing process, we use our estimated classical model to calculate what would have happened
if the government’s beliefs had differed from our estimates. First, we will look at belief
drifts in the Phillips curve. Then, we will examine how the covariance matrix V affects
these drifts.
V.1. Two Historical Episodes. All of the results in this section condition on our estimates
of the historical shocks of unemployment and inﬂation inferred from our model estimates.
We treat these shocks as random and exogenous in our counterfactual exercises.
The ﬁrst episode begins in 1964:01. As seen from Figure 5, there is still little belief in
the inﬂation-unemployment tradeoff in the early 1964, but by then end of 1973 the sum ofSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 33

































FIGURE 15. Inﬂation dynamics with ﬁxed beliefs at the dates 79:10 and 73:12.
the inﬂation coefﬁcients is most negative.24 Such continual adaptation of beliefs towards
a bigger inﬂation-unemployment tradeoff gives the government an incentive, through the
Phelps problem, to run a high inﬂation policy. This can be seen indirectly in Figure 7
as the perceived costs of low inﬂation rise dramatically in the early 1970s. To obtain a
more direct comparison, suppose the government’s beliefs had been frozen at the 64:01
initial condition. As shown in Figure 14, the inﬂation path would have been smoother and
avoided much of the two large run-ups of actual inﬂation in the 70s. To take an opposite
example, we replace the government’s 64:01 beliefs with the 73:12 beliefs and ﬁx them
throughout the history. In this case, Figure 14 shows that inﬂation would have been much
higher than was actually experienced throughout the sample and would have continued to
stay around 10%.
24See Sargent (1999, chapter 5) for how the sum of coefﬁcients on p affects the advice rendered by the
Phelps problem.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 34
Figure 15 displays the second episode beginning with 1979:10, when Volcker’s disin-
ﬂation policy took place. As we’ve seen, if the government had held ﬁxed to its 1973:12
perceived tradeoff, inﬂation would have stayed much higher. On the other hand, if the
government’s belief at 1979:10 had been ﬁxed throughout the rest of the history, inﬂation
would have come down to 5% by 1986 due to the sequence of historical shocks, but there
would have been a tendency to return to a higher inﬂation level. These outcomes show the
importance of the adaptation of the government’s beliefs to achieve low inﬂation. With the
same sequence of historical shocks, actual inﬂation came down and remained low as shown
by the inﬂation path in Figure 15. Although the government’s beliefs at the end of 1979
favored a disinﬂation, Figure 5 shows how the government’s views continued to evolve to
favor a low inﬂation policy. The experience of disinﬂation and continued low inﬂation led
the government away from believing in an exploitable Phillips curve tradeoff.
These exercises suggest that while the rise of inﬂation in the 70s was caused by the
government’s misperceptions about the Phillips-curve relationship, the fall of inﬂation in
the 1980s can be rationalized by an econometric policy evaluation procedure that embodies
adapted beliefs.25
V.2. Importance of V. As we’ve already noted, crucial to our empirical success is the
ﬂexibility of our model in ﬁtting the government’s beliefs. In particular, previous work
of Sims, Chung, Sargent, and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (but not Sargent and Williams)
had assumed a particular form for the key matrix V in (8) that governs the innovations to
the parameters in the government’s model. We have already discussed theoretical reasons
why the V matrix is so important and how different speciﬁcations of it greatly affect the
speed, direction, and stability of the learning dynamics. Previous work ﬁxedV in ways that
25Changes in beliefs do not necessarily imply changes in the linearized policy rule in which xt is regressed
on its own lagged values and current and lagged unemployment variables. In our case, because xt tracks the
actual inﬂation path so well, our results are consistent with reduced-form empirical ﬁndings that changes in
the policy rule or the inﬂation process are difﬁcult to detect statistically (Cogley and Sargent 2003, Primiceri
2003a, and Sims and Zha 2004).SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 35



































FIGURE 16. Actual and forecast inﬂation (government policy) with V de-
rived from E(FF0)¡1.
constrained how learning could occur, thereby diminishing the variation in the data that
could be explained by evolving government beliefs.
One particular example of the importance of the V matrix is shown in Figure 16. There
we ﬁx the values of all the other structural parameters (including the estimated initial con-
dition P1j0) but only alter V. Most learning models such as Sargent (1999) have focused
on a recursive least squares learning rule that is closely related to the Kalman ﬁlter. Sar-
gent and Williams (2003) show that RLS can be approximated by a Kalman ﬁlter with V
proportional to s2E(FF0)¡1. In the ﬁgure, therefore, we use the sample estimate of the
second moment matrix and we choose the proportionality factor so that the new V matrix
has the same norm as our estimate. This choice of V evidently leads to a substantial de-
terioration in ﬁt. The government’s optimal policy suggests very low inﬂation (with a few
outliers) for almost the entire sample, which is what Sargent (1999) found. In particular, it
completely misses the two peaks in inﬂation in the 1970s. This illustrates a point made by
Chung (1990) and Sargent (1999), both of whom noted that their models implied that theSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 36





































FIGURE 17. Actualandforecastinﬂation(governmentpolicy)withV being
scaled down by 0:01.
government should have cut inﬂation much earlier than actually occurred in the data. How-
ever, that outcome relied on attributing to the government very particular beliefs about how
its model changes over time. By allowing the data to inform our choice of these beliefs, we
are able much better to explain the rise and fall of inﬂation.
As discussed in Section IV.4.2, the self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE) governs the inﬂa-
tion dynamics of our model only for a scaled-down value of V. Figure 17 shows another
example of the importance of theV matrix where the originally estimatedV is scaled down
by 0:01. Again, this inﬂation policy completely misses the rise and fall of actual inﬂation.
In this case, the model remains close to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium throughout the
sample, and we’ve seen that inﬂation is low in the SCE.
What are the long-run implications of the estimated V? The large value of V suggests
that one expect escapes from SCE to be frequent even if the inﬂation rate at the Nash
equilibrium is much higher. To illustrate this point, we change q0 from its estimated value
of ¡0:0008 to ¡1:0 while keeping all the other estimates ﬁxed. This implies that the NashSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 37









FIGURE 18. Long-run inﬂation dynamics with q0 = ¡1:0, using the end-
of-sample estimate as the initial condition.
inﬂation rate is around 10%, while the socially optimal Ramsey level remains at 2%. As
can be seen from Figure 18, inﬂation tends to be high, but the large time-variation of the
drifting beliefs implied byV allows the dynamics to escape to low inﬂation repeatedly, and
there is no tendency for inﬂation to stay very long at the high level. Thus, our V matrix is
consistent with repeated escapes in the long run, but they are difﬁcult to detect under our
estimates because we estimated a low sacriﬁce ratio.
VI. RELATION TO OTHER LITERATURE
Sargent (1999) fashions two competing stories about the acceleration of US inﬂation
during the 1970s and Volcker’s conquest of inﬂation during the early 1980s. The ﬁrst story,
called the ‘triumph of the natural rate theory’, explains the run up of inﬂation as reﬂecting
the monetary authority’s yielding to the temptation to exploit a non-expectational PhillipsSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 38
curve, while Volcker’s conquest of inﬂation comes from the monetary authority ﬁrst learn-
ing a correct rational expectations version of the natural unemployment rate hypothesis,
then somehow managing to commit itself to the Ramsey policy. The competing story,
called the ‘vindication of econometric policy evaluation’, shares the ‘triumph’ story’s ac-
count of the run up of inﬂation but differs about Volcker’s stabilization. According to the
vindication story, the Fed never learned a sharp rational expectations version of the natural
rate hypothesis. Instead, sequentially reﬁtting the misspeciﬁed non-expectational Phillips
curve led the Fed to discover inﬂation-unemployment dynamics that prompted it, through
a Phelps problem, to stabilize inﬂation by the early 1980s. According to the vindication ar-
gument, allowing the data to speak continuously, even through estimates of a misspeciﬁed
Phillips curve model, did a good enough job to prompt the Fed to stabilize.26
Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), and Sargent and Williams (2003)
added structure and further features to the vindication story by analyzing versions of the
modelinthispaper. Theyaprioriadoptedparameterspeciﬁcationsthatopenedasubstantial
gap between the Ramsey and Nash inﬂation outcomes, and their work discovered both the
mean dynamics that on average push outcomes toward the Nash inﬂation level and the
escape dynamics that recurrently push it toward the Ramsey outcome.
The present paper produces estimates of the key parameters that ignite the mean dynam-
ics and escape dynamics. As we have stressed, our empirical estimates deemphasize the
roles of both the mean dynamics and the escape dynamics and instead emphasize the short-
term impacts of shocks on government beliefs. In addition, our estimate of a small gap
between the Nash and Ramsey inﬂation levels supports Blinder’s (1998) skepticism about
whether that gap is central quantitatively to the monetary authority’s decision problem.
Cogley and Sargent (2004) provides an alternative econometric explanation of US post
WWII inﬂation that also features the interaction of a government learning process and a
sequence of Phelps problems. Cogley and Sargent’s learning process has the government
26The oral tradition in which the vindication story originates, which Sargent heard from Albert Ando, saw
it as a puzzle that Volcker waited so long to stabilize.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 39
apply Bayes’ rule as it estimates three Phillips curve models, one of which a rational ex-
pectations version of a natural rate model.
Primiceri (2003b) also develops a learning model to explain the rise and fall of US inﬂa-
tion. HeestimateshismodelonUSdataandﬁndsthatitsﬁtiscomparabletoanatheoretical
VAR as a description of the data. Like us, he emphasizes that inﬂation remained high in
the 1970s due to the government’s perception that disinﬂation was too costly. Unlike us, a
key component of his model is the mismeasurement of the natural rate of unemployment,
which caused policy to be looser than policymakers thought. Our paper differ substantially
from his in its theoretical structure. Our true economy is a rational expectations natural rate
model, and policymakers can eventually converge to a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, a type
of rational expectations equilibrium. Primiceri’s main focus is on a backward-looking Key-
nesian model, with no role for expectations.27 We view the rational expectations natural
rate theory as a useful starting point in analyzing the behavior of inﬂation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ourestimatesattributethedifferinginﬂationoutcomesoverthepost-warperiodtochanges
over time in the monetary authority’s beliefs. According to our estimated model, that learn-
ing process explains the delayed reaction to rising inﬂation in that period.
Our empirical results suggest an interpretation that differs from the work we build on.
Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) suggested that US experience could
be explained by convergence to a high Nash inﬂation level coupled with occasional escapes
toalowerRamseylevel. AsdiscussedbySargentandWilliams(2003), theseoutcomesalso
occur in our model when we set parameters of the true Phillips curve to allow a larger gap
between the Nash and Ramsey levels of inﬂation, and when we also impose what, relative
to our estimates, is a scaled-down innovation volatility matrixV in the government’s belief-
drift dynamics (8). However, with our estimates, it appears that oscillations between the
27Primiceri also considers a New Keynesian rational expectations model, but it ﬁts substantially worse
than his backward-looking speciﬁcation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 40
Nash and Ramsey levels of inﬂation, driven alternately by the mean dynamics and then the
escape dynamics of, say, the Sargent-Williams (2003) model, were not the main forces that
accounted for the inﬂation process that the monetary authorities in the US chose to preside
over during the post WWII years. For one thing, our estimates of the Nash level of inﬂation
turned out to be near the Ramsey level.28 Instead, the rise in inﬂation was driven by the
interaction of shocks and government beliefs, and the fall in inﬂation was due to changes in
those beliefs. If the US monetary authority remembers the lessons that prompted Volcker
to disinﬂate in the early 1980s, then maybe Volcker’s conquest of US inﬂation will endure.
APPENDIX A. DATA
The two monthly series employed in this paper are:
² Civilian unemployment rate, 16 years and older, seasonally adjusted (source: BLS);
² PCE chain price index (2000=100), seasonally adjusted (source: BEA).
Inﬂation is measured as an annual rate (12-month ended) of change of the PCE price index.
The estimation sample (including lags) is from January 1960 to December 2003.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
From equations (1) and (2) it can be seen that the Jacobian transformation from w1t and




















28Furthermore, if we arbitrarily set the parameters of the true expectational Phillips curve to create a big
gap between the SCE-Nash and the Ramsey inﬂations, but retain estimated innovation covarianceV, escapes
from a SCE again occur frequently enough to vitiate any pattern of recurrent oscillations between the SCE
and Ramsey levels of inﬂation.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 41
As deﬁned in the text, z1t and z2t are the functions of q and j:
z1t = ut ¡u¤¡q0(pt ¡xt¡1)¡q1(pt¡1¡xt¡2)¡t1(ut¡1¡u¤);
z2t = pt ¡xt¡1;
where the optimal decision rule depends on j. The prior pdf of f is
p(f) = p(q)p(j)p(z1;z2);
where the pdfs on the right hand side of the above equation are deﬁned in (11), (12), and
(13).
The posterior pdf of f is proportional to the product of the likelihood (B1) and the prior
p(f):
p(fjIT) µ L (ITjf) p(f): (B2)
Because xt¡1 does not depend on q, z1, and z2, it can be seen from (B2) and (B1) that
the posterior distribution of q conditional on all other parameters is Gaussian and that the
posterior distribution of z1 and z2 is of Gamma. Algebra leads to the Gaussian form (14)
and the Gamma form (15).
APPENDIX C. PRIOR SETTINGS
Our estimation results are quite similar to the maximum likelihood estimates. But the
prior is essential for obtaining ﬁnite-sample inferences because the government belief pa-
rameter matrix V may not have a proper density function when there is no prior. The prior
for q is mostly based on economic theory. For example, the mass prior probability of q0 is
in the negative region.
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which implies that the natural rate of unemployment is 6.0 with somewhat persistent un-
employment. The prior mean of q1 is only slightly less than that of q0 in absolute value
(:16 < :20), implying the low serial correlation of structural disturbances in Sargent’s ver-





















where l1 controls the tightness of the prior variance. With l1 = 1, the prior standard
deviation allows large variation but at the same time gives little probability to negative
values of v¤, or positive values of q0 and q1, or the value of t1 being greater than 1 (an
explosive root).
For the prior of z1 and z2, we set ¯ a = 4 and ¯ b = 12:5l2. By setting l2 = 1, the prior
mean for zi becomes 50 and the prior variance becomes 252, implying a quite loose prior
for zi.
The prior mean for CP and CV is 0. The prior variance is 52l3 for the diagonals of CP
andCV and 2:52 for the off-diagonal elements. The tightness control hyperparameter is set
at 0.5.
In this paper, we have checked the robustness of our estimated results by varying the
values of the tightness control parameters l1, l2, and l3.
APPENDIX D. PROPOSAL DENSITY FOR THE METROPOLIS ALGORITHM
The key to the Metropolis algorithm for the posterior distribution j is to obtain the
covariance matrix for a normal proposal density. Since xt¡1 is a function of j, one can
approximate it by a second-order Taylor expansion at the posterior estimate ˆ j. It can beSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 43










































where ¯ Sj is the prior covariance matrix for j.
APPENDIX E. STATISTICAL COMPARISON TO BVARS
Wecompute themarginaldatadensity(MDD)for ourlearningmodel, usingthe modiﬁed
harmonic mean method described in Geweke (1999). The log MDD value is about 27.50,
which is substantially lower compared to monthly Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR)
models of unemployment and inﬂation. With the standard prior settings proposed by Sims
and Zha (1998), the log MDD value is 172.05 for the BVAR with one lag and 244.65 for
the BVAR with 13 lags. By the measure of Bayes factors, the BVARs (including the BVAR
with only one lag) dominate our learning model. Note that this result may be sensitive to
the priors used in estimating the models. The prior for our model was loose along several
dimensions, which means that the MDD may be penalizing our model more heavily than
the VAR.
Higher Bayes factors do not necessarily imply that BVARs outperform our learning
model in explaining the rise and fall of inﬂation. Figure E1 displays the forecast from
the BVAR(1). The 68% and 90% error bands are produced by simulating the VAR shocks
while holding the parameter estimates ﬁxed at those obtained using the 60:01-03:12 sam-
ple, the same procedure as we did for our learning model. As can be seen, this BVAR fails
to predict any rise of inﬂation with a signiﬁcant probability. And the upper 90% band is
well below 10%.
Figure E2 shows the forecasts of inﬂation at the various dates from the BVAR(13), re-
sembling Figure 8. The forecasts at 73:01 from the BVAR(13) are not so different fromSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 44






























Forecast months after 73:01
Actual
Median forecast
FIGURE E1. Dynamic forecasts of inﬂation from BVAR(1) at 73:01, with
68% and 90% probability bands.
those from the BVAR(1) except the error bands are much wider. It gives half probability to
a decline of inﬂation.
For the forecasts at 74:01, the BVAR forecasts are comparable to those from our learning
model.
The forecasts at 77:01 from the BVAR(13) again gives half probability to a decline of
inﬂation while the forecasts from our learning model (Figure 8) put a vast majority of
probability to rising inﬂation.
For the forecast at 84:04, the BVAR(13) predicts the decline of inﬂation like our learning
model. But our learning model predicts a much sharper decline of inﬂation with narrow
bands while the BVAR gives a considerable probability of higher inﬂation than the actual
path with wider bands.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 45
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Forecast months after 74:01
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Forecast months after 77:01
Actual
Median forecast






























Forecast months after 80:04
Actual
Median forecast
FIGURE E2. Dynamic forecasts of inﬂation from BVAR(13) at 73:01,
74:01, 77:01, and 80:04, with 68% and 90% error bands.
APPENDIX F. ACCOUNTING FOR PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY
In this appendix, we report probability bands on key government policy variables. We
ﬁrst assess how sharply inﬂation set by the government’s policy (xt¡1) is estimated. Figure
F1 displays the error bands, which are generated with both parameter uncertainty and ex-
ogenous random inﬂation shocks. Clearly, the bands themselves track the rise and fall of
actual inﬂation very well.
The key insight into the intricate interactions between shocks and government beliefs is
the perceived long-run tradeoffs under the Ramsey policy. Figure F2 reports the estimatedSHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 46






































FIGURE F1. Inﬂation: actual vs one-step forecast with 90% error bands














FIGURE F2. Perceived long-run excess unemployment under Ramsey pol-
icy of 2% with 90% error bands.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 47
tradeoffs with 90% error bands. The large tradeoffs in the 70s are sharply estimated. Judg-
ing by the error bands, the small but sharp ﬂuctuations of tradeoffs experienced in the 60s
do not exist in the 90s; the government’s perceived tradeoffs are smaller and stabler in the
90s.SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT BELIEFS 48
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